ADF capability review: Australian Army by Andrew Davies & Mark Thomson
This ASPI Policy Analysis is the second in a series intended to inform the 
Defence White Paper debate by providing a snapshot of ADF capability. 
The previous release considered Navy capabilities and future releases will 
cover Air Force and C4ISR capabilities.
Overview
With over 27,000 permanent and almost 16,000 part-time Reserve 
personnel, the Australian Army is small by regional standards and tiny 
given the size of our continent. Structured as a standing force rather than 
a mobilisation base, the Army is designed to be able to deploy and sustain 
a brigade group of around 3,000 troops indefi nitely while retaining the 
capacity to deploy a battalion group of around 1,000 temporarily. Larger 
scale deployments are possible for a limited duration—as occurred to 
East Timor in 1999—or for extended periods if the current six-month troop 
rotation policy is relaxed. 
At its core, the permanent Army is made up of six infantry battalions 
(including one commando battalion) two cavalry regiments, one armoured 
regiment and a Special Air Service regiment. These troops are supported 
by one aviation brigade, three artillery regiments, three combat engineer 
regiments and one air defence regiment, plus a comprehensive range 
of combat support and logistic support elements. In reality, many of the 
elements established as regiments are actually of a smaller scale. 
The Reserve fulfi ls several roles at present. It provides individual personnel 
to help sustain permanent force deployments, it contributes sub-unit 
elements to low-intensity operations such as East Timor and the Solomon 
Islands, and it delivers a modest capacity to assist with domestic security. 
For the future, its role is being broadened through the establishment of a 
small High Readiness Reserve integrated into some permanent units. 
Legislation allows the Reserve to be called out for full-time service in a 
broad range of circumstance and ex-permanent force personnel remain 
liable for call-out for fi ve years after separation. However, neither plans 
nor adequate equipment holdings exist for a large scale mobilisation of the 
Reserve despite it retaining a structure of six nascent brigades. 
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The Army’s capacity to deploy and sustain operations is being increased 
through the progressive addition of two more permanent infantry battalions. 
This will see the full-time Army expand to around 30,500 personnel by early 
next decade. At the same time, the land force is being re-equipped with better 
armoured mobility and networked communications under the Hardened and 
Networked Army (HNA) program. The HNA program aims to structure and 
equip the Army so it can fi ght in complex terrain and contribute to coalition 
operations of up to medium intensity. This will be achieved through increased 
fi repower, protected mobility and network connectivity. Under HNA, the Army 
will have enhanced fl exibility to reconfi gure into mission-specifi c combined 
arms battle groups commanded by battalion/regiment level headquarters. 
Principal formations of the permanent Army include the mechanised 
1st Brigade in Darwin and Adelaide, the light 3rd Brigade in Townsville and 
the motorised 7th Brigade in Brisbane. Each of these three brigades contains 
a mixture of capabilities including infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer and 
logistics units. The 16th Brigade (aviation) has elements in Townsville, Sydney, 
Oakey and Darwin.  Reserve formations are scattered around the country 
broadly in line with the country’s population.
Like the other services, the ability to collect, manipulate and disseminate 
intelligence, tactical information and positional data is critical to Army’s 
effectiveness. These issues will be developed further in the ADF C4ISR paper 
to follow in this series.
Arguably, the most signifi cant current capability shortfall for Army is the 
lack of a modern ground-based air defence that can deploy with land units. 
Current plans will replace existing short-range equipment about a decade 
from now, but Army will still not have wide-area long-range air defence 
that can deploy integrally with land units. Other areas where capability 
could usefully be augmented or expanded include; a protected combat 
engineer capability, greater capacity for human intelligence and civic military 
cooperation, and the scale and manning of logistics elements. 
Major considerations in the medium term include:
• the choice of replacement artillery pieces 
• introduction into service of new helicopter and light vehicle fl eets 
• replacement of aging analogue battlefi eld communication systems 
and the progressive networking of land forces 
• development and introduction into service of an expanded amphibious 
capability when the Navy’s two new Amphibious Assault Vessels 
enter service early next decade.
In the longer-term, a critical point will be reached with the replacement of 
Army’s existing fl eets of protected mobility vehicles. There are a range of 
possible options, each offering a different combination and level of fi repower 
and protection. Present funding is probably inadequate to replace the existing 
fl eets with top-end infantry fi ghting vehicles on a one to one basis.
Capability summary
Individual components of Army capability are examined below. Though a 
capability based examination is unavoidable, it is important to note that the 
Army prepares for combined arms operations that integrate and closely 
coordinate the full range of land capabilities. 
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Infantry 
As a light to medium weight force, the Australian Army is built around its 
infantry. As part of an integrated land force, infantry can be employed within 
combined arms teams. 
Budget cuts in the early 1990s forced a reduction in the number of permanent 
infantry battalions from six to four. However, in response to the demands 
of East Timor in 1999, two battalions were subsequently reinstated. Then, 
in 2001, one of the battalions was converted to a commando unit and 
transferred to Special Forces command. At present there are: 
• three light infantry battalions (including one parachute battalion)
• one motorised battalion 
• one mechanised battalion. 
Because Army has failed to meet recruiting targets in nine out of the 
past ten years, personnel numbers remain below budgeted strength. A 
consequence of these recruiting shortfalls and the high operational tempo of 
the last decade is that Army is experiencing diffi culty in maintaining numbers 
in positions that require advanced infantry skills, especially in some support 
company categories. In part, this has been managed by reducing the number 
of infantry companies in some battalions from four to three.
Under the HNA initiative, the parachute battalion will be converted to a 
light infantry battalion and a further mechanised infantry battalion and a 
light infantry battalion will be raised. It remains to be seen if one of these 
new light battalions is given a parachute role (although the new commando 
battalion is parachute capable, its deployability is limited by domestic 
security commitments). 
Infantry weapons and equipment are of a similar standard to that of other 
advanced Western armies. In recent years, a priority has been placed on 
acquiring protected mobility, and recent operations have seen the rapid 
acquisition of some items, including specialist clothing, body armour and 
man-portable Javelin anti-armour missiles. Planned acquisitions of infantry 
equipment in the next decade include new mortars, direct fi re weapons 
and small arms. Up to a further $950 million has been programmed to 
boost the capabilities of the individual combat soldier under the heading of 
‘soldier enhancement’. 
Special Forces 
Over the past seven years, Special Forces have been expanded and unifi ed 
under a separate command within Army. Headquartered in Sydney, the key 
elements of Special Forces include the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) 
in Western Australia and a commando battalion and Incident Response 
Regiment (IRR) in Sydney. A Reserve commando regiment is split between 
Sydney and Melbourne.
Well equipped and able to deploy by land, sea or air, Special Forces provide 
a fl exible range of capabilities from long-range patrol through to strike raids 
and special recovery operations. An expanded role in domestic counter-
terrorism emerged for Special Forces after 2001 and a standing squadron-
strength Tactical Assault Group is now maintained on both the East and 
West coasts. The IRR provides a capacity to respond to a nuclear, chemical, 
biological or radiological event within Australia. 
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Armour 
Tanks
Army has now taken delivery of fi fty-nine refurbished Abrams M1A1-AIM 
tanks from the United States at a cost of $560 million. The Abrams replace 
the Leopard tank which had become vulnerable due to the proliferation of 
shoulder-fi red anti-armour weapons in our region. 
Although the refurbished Abrams is a more capable platform than the 
Leopard, the transition involves a reduced number of vehicles. The 
59 Abrams will replace 101 Leopards that themselves replaced 143 of their 
predecessor, the Centurion. Thus, while the technical sophistication of Army’s 
armoured capability is now keeping pace with developments, the scale of 
armoured support continues to decline—notwithstanding that the Army is 
otherwise expanding. 
Although the Abrams M1A1-AIM is one of the more capable variants in the 
US Abrams family, it is inferior to the newer M1A2-SEP variant in several 
respects. The latter has depleted uranium armour, more advanced command 
and control capabilities and a sighting and targeting system that is more 
effective, especially at long ranges. And although it provides good protection 
against early generation shoulder-fi red anti-armour weapons now prevalent 
in the region, it is vulnerable to advanced Russian systems proliferating 
elsewhere, including the Middle East. 
Armoured mobility vehicles
The Army operates three types of armoured mobility vehicle; the US 
designed M113 armoured personnel carrier, the Canadian built ASLAV 
light armoured vehicle and the Australia designed Bushmaster infantry 
mobility vehicle.
The tracked M113 armoured personnel carrier has been in service with the 
Australian Army since 1965. The vehicle provides tracked mobility, protection 
and fi repower for up to ten personnel. Of the more than 700 vehicles in 
inventory, around 430 are to be upgraded and returned to service, with 
improved armour, fi repower, suspension, engine and drive train at a cost of 
$617 million. After a three year delay, the fi rst upgraded vehicles entered 
service in late 2007. The upgraded fl eet will have the capacity to mechanise 
two battalions plus supporting elements. 
Being a tracked vehicle that has variants with a 12.5mm turret gun, the 
M113 fl eet provides good mobility in rough terrain and light fi repower. 
While the upgraded vehicles will protect occupants against small arms, 
anti-personnel mines, light anti-armour weapons and shrapnel, the vehicle 
will remain vulnerable to 12.5mm or larger projectiles, medium to heavy 
anti-armour weapons, large Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and 
anti-armour mines. With the exception of the M1A1 Abrams tank, the 
upgraded M113 is equipped with the best side-blast protected armour of the 
three armoured vehicles in service with the Australian Army. In addition, due 
to the M113’s fl at-bottom hull design, the vehicle’s protection against 
under-vehicle IED is inferior to more modern hull confi gurations such as the 
ASLAV (see below).
 
Following purchases that commenced in the early 1990s, the Army now 
has a fl eet of 257 ASLAV light armoured vehicles. These 8x8 wheeled 
quasi-amphibious vehicles provide an armoured reconnaissance and 
personnel carrier capability suffi cient to equip two cavalry regiments. Each 
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vehicle can carry eight troops in the armoured personnel carrier variant or 
four in the gun variant, which is equipped with a turret mounted 25mm gun. 
Protection for ASLAV occupants is inferior to that of the M113 due to 
increased vulnerability to light anti-armour weapons and ballistic projectiles.    
The most recent addition to the Army’s range of armoured vehicles is the 
Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicle. After extended delays, 299 vehicles 
have now been delivered with a further 398 on order. Each of the 
4x4 vehicles is capable of carrying up to ten personnel. When complete, the 
Bushmaster fl eet will provide mobility adequate for roughly four battalions 
plus supporting elements. In addition to having inferior mobility over rough 
terrain compared to the M113 and ASLAV the Bushmaster is not designed 
as a fi ghting vehicle; and although it provides similar protection to an ASLAV 
(and superior with regard to mines and IEDs) its single roof mounted machine 
gun gives it inferior fi repower.  
Taken together, the Army’s eventual fl eet of 1,303 armoured vehicles will 
provide protected mobility and fi repower for two cavalry regiments and seven 
to eight infantry battalions and some supporting elements depending on 
how assets are allocated. Army’s current fl eet provides limited protection 
against emerging threats such as IEDs. On current plans, replacement of the 
M113 and ASLAV fl eets will commence in the second half of the next decade. 
While it is much too early to identify a replacement vehicle, present funding 
would likely constrain the options to something less than a top-end infantry 
fi ghting vehicle. 
Aviation 
Transport
Following the retirement of its 1960s-vintage Iroquois helicopters in 2007, 
the Army’s air transport capability comprises thirty-three Black Hawk and 
six Chinook helicopters. The Black Hawk can carry eight fully equipped 
soldiers and the twin-rotor Chinook thirty-three. In practice, the resulting 
deployable single-lift capacity would be enough for several infantry 
companies but not a battalion. The Chinooks have only a basic self-defence 
suite against anti-air missiles, while the Black Hawk’s self-defence capability 
is even less effective. On current plans both aircraft will be fi tted with an 
improved self-defence suite before the end of the decade at a cost of 
$240 million.  
Following extensive delays, Army is now expected to begin operating the fi rst 
four of twelve MRH-90 troop lift helicopters in 2011. The European-designed 
MRH-90 is a medium helicopter with capacity for twelve to fourteen 
fully-equipped troops (depending on the results of Army’s MRH-90 cabin 
trials). From 2015 the existing Black Hawks (and Navy’s Sea Kings) will 
be replaced by a further thirty-four MRH-90 aircraft. The total cost of the 
forty-six aircraft will be $3.6 billion. The MRH-90 will come equipped with a 
modern missile self-defence system and will be capable of operating as an 
embarked helicopter. 
Aerial reconnaissance and fi re support 
Forty-one Kiowa light observation helicopters provide the Army with a fl exible 
aerial reconnaissance capability. However, since the retirement of the last 
six Iroquois gunships in 2004, the Army has been without a dedicated aerial 
fi re support platform. The replacement for both capabilities—the ‘Tiger’ 
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH)—was due to enter service in 
fi nancial year 2004/05 but has been delayed until at least 2008. Designed 
as an anti-tank attack helicopter for the Cold War, the ARH will be a much 
more capable platform than either the Kiowa or Iroquois gunships in their 
respective roles. Inevitably, however, the purchase of only twenty-two 
aircraft will deliver a reduced rate of effort, more limited concurrency for 
reconnaissance, and the loss of fl exibility provided by the utility Iroquois.  
Artillery 
The Army has a total of one hundred and nine 105mm towed Hamel fi eld 
guns and thirty-six 155 mm towed medium howitzers. Both weapons were 
acquired in the 1980s. The Hamel guns are divided between Field Regiments 
attached to 3rd Brigade and 7th Brigade while the howitzers are held by a 
Medium Regiment in 1st Brigade. 
The present inventory of guns and howitzers are scheduled for replacement 
early next decade at a total cost of up to $600 million. In each case, a 
smaller but qualitatively improved capability is sought. The current towed 
howitzers will be replaced by around eighteen protected self-propelled 
155mm howitzers, while the existing 105mm guns will be replaced by around 
thirty-six lightweight towed 155mm howitzers. Because more than half of the 
existing guns and howitzers are not in use, the cuts will leave the scale of 
the permanent Army’s artillery capability unchanged. What will be lost is the 
capacity to expand, although the relegation of existing assets to the Reserve 
could mitigate this. 
Indirect fi re support can also be provided by mortar tubes. The Army 
currently has only 81mm man-portable mortars, with a maximum range of 
around 5km. A larger mortar (such as a 120mm system) would provide a 
rapidly deployable indirect fi re support asset with a range of 8km or more 
(depending on the munitions) and with a much smaller logistics footprint than 
artillery. There are no current plans to acquire such a system.
Engineers
The Army maintains a large number of Engineering capabilities. The heaviest 
capabilities are the construction engineering units that can build infrastructure 
for deployed forces or deliver projects as part of a civil action program—as 
in Afghanistan today. As an integral part of a combined arms team, combat 
engineers provide a range of capabilities including bridging, construction of 
fi eld defences and the elimination of physical obstacles. However, the Army’s 
present combat engineer capability lacks the protection needed to support 
manoeuvre operations in all circumstances.
Other units are more specialised, such as the Incident Response Regiment 
that can respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents 
domestically or in support of deployed forces.   
Air defence 
Following the retirement of the Rapier surface-to-air system in 2005, the 
Army’s air defence capability now comprise a regimental headquarters and 
two batteries equipped with the short-range RBS-70 system.  With a range of 
8km and a ceiling of around 16,000 feet, the man portable RBS-70 provides 
local protection against low fl ying aircraft and helicopters but is ineffective 
against high altitude aircraft and medium range stand-off weapons. The 
RBS-70 system is further limited by employing a laser guided missile that 
requires manual guidance to intercept.
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On current plans, these shortcomings will remain until at least 2018 when 
the RBS-70 system will be either upgraded or replaced. With up to $1 billion 
earmarked for the project, it should be possible to acquire an improved short- 
to medium-range system that, nonetheless, will fall well short of a long-range 
wide-area defence system like the US Patriot. Until then, the Army will have 
to hope that either RAAF or coalition assets are available to protect against 
an even moderately capable air threat and, even then, the persistence 
required for 24/7 protection against the full range of air threats (including 
low-level unmanned aerial vehicles) will be diffi cult to arrange.  
Land transport
All parts of the Army depend extensively on motorised transport. There 
are roughly 4,000 four-by-four or six-by-six land rovers, 1,300 four-by-four 
Mercedes-Benz Unimog trucks and 900 six-by-six heavy Mack cargo 
vehicles.  Under project Overlander, a range of new vehicles will be 
progressively acquired between now and the middle of the next decade. 
Subject to negotiations, over the next several years around 1,000 
Mercedes-Benz G-Wagen four-by-four and six-by-six light unarmoured utility 
vehicles will be acquired along with 2,400 BAE Systems lightly armoured 
medium and heavy trucks. This is planned to be followed next decade by 
a further 1,200 light armoured vehicles and 2,000 commercial off-the-shelf 
trucks. The end result will be a modernised land transport fl eet with improved 
crew and passenger protection on a signifi cant proportion of the vehicles. 
Taking into account the number of armoured vehicles as well, this means 
that Army will operate a total of well over seven thousand vehicles. Given 
the total size of Army, a fl eet of this size translates into a demanding 
maintenance requirement.
Logistics and combat support
The Army has to be able to support a wide range of combat capabilities 
in adverse environments over large distances. The requisite logistic and 
combat support capabilities include health, construction, survey, intelligence, 
surveillance, transport, signals, equipment repair and maintenance, 
engineering, and the resupply of fuels, stores, munitions, rations and water. 
A detailed analysis of these many specialised areas is beyond the scope of 
the broad assessment being attempted here. The critical question is whether 
the scale, quality and range of logistic and combat support align with what the 
Army’s combat elements might demand. The answer is a qualifi ed yes. 
By the end of the 1990s, the Army’s support capabilities had degraded 
signifi cantly following an extended period of budget driven constraints and 
limited operational demand. After the East Timor deployment in 1999, a 
higher priority was placed on support capabilities. This saw new investment 
in a number of areas and the allocation of personnel to remove hollowness in 
support units. As a result, the Army is now much better placed to support and 
sustain deployments than it was. That said, problems with recruitment and 
retention in some specialist trades remain a concern. And, in any case, an 
extended deployment on a larger scale than presently underway would place 
strain on many support areas—a problem that will be exacerbated by the 
addition of two more infantry battalions. 
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Over the last several years, the ADF has employed private sector support 
in East Timor, Solomon Islands, Iraq and Afghanistan. This has helped to 
reduce the demands made on Army’s organic support capabilities. Generally 
speaking the ADF has learnt how to make good use of private contractors 
where operationally feasible to do so but continue to resist taking the next 
step, which is to engage the private sector on a stand-by basis, as is routine 
practice for the US and UK military. 
Civic military action
As the ‘boots on the ground’ in operations around the globe, the Army very 
often fi nds itself working within local communities. Recent operations in 
East Timor, Solomon Islands, Iraq and Afghanistan prove that the Army can 
do so effectively. While the enduring good nature of the Australian soldier 
has no doubt played a big role in these operations, there was also a high 
degree of conscious effort to build and maintain constructive relations. 
Doing so requires a range of human intelligence, language, and specialist 
communication and liaison skills. While the Army has adapted quickly to 
develop these sorts of capabilities as demands have arisen, it is an area 
where further development and refi nement will be necessary if the recent 
pattern of deployments continues. 
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